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Abstract 
This study uses cross-sectional data to investigate the regional differences in women's participation 
in the labor market. Women's participation is high in the northern coastal region of Japan. Their high 
rate of participation is caused by the fact that married women with children participate as regular 
full-time employees. A possible explanation for the high participation in the northern coastal region 
is a combination of (1) a high degree of manufacturing in the northern coastal region and (2) supply 
side factors that motivate women to work.   
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 1.  Introduction 
  It is widely believed that Japan is a country in wihch women’s participation in 
the labor market lags behind that of other developed countries. While women’s 
participation rates have risen continuously over time, the cross-sectional participation 
profile in 2007 still exhibits an M-shaped pattern in Japan, while the profiles of many 
other developed countries are inverse U-shaped (Abe and Oishi 2007; Blau, Ferber, and 
Winkler 2010).   
The shape of the participation profile, however, differs significantly across 
regions within Japan. The participation rates are quite high in the northern coastal area 
from Yamagata to Shimane; the employment-population ratio (E-P ratio) of women 
aged 25-54 residing in this region was 77 percent in 2007, while that in Tokyo was 62 
percent.
1 Figures 1a and 1b plot the E-P ratio of females and males in four areas in 
Japan: (1) suburban Tokyo (Saitama, Chiba, and Kanagawa); (2) Tokyo; (3) the northern 
coastal prefectures (Yamagata, Niigata, Toyama, Ishikawa, Fukui, Tottori, and 
Shimane); and (4) the Kansai metropolitan area (Kyoto, Osaka, and Hyogo). The figures 
show three notable patterns. First, the E-P ratio of women is much higher in the northern 
coastal area than in other areas, irrespective of age. Second, while the E-P ratio falls 
between ages 30 and 39 in all regions, the extent of fall is much smaller in the northern 
                                                        
1  The participation rate in areas outside of the northern coastal area and outside of Tokyo is 65 
percent. 
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 coastal area than in other areas. In other words, the age profile of the E-P ratio in the 
northern coastal area is less like an M-shape than in other areas. Finally, a comparison 
of males and females shows that female participation has greater regional variations 
than male participation. 
In this paper, I document the regional differences in participation behavior by 
focusing on the following four aspects: (1) participation in regular full-time work and 
part-time work, (2) educational attainment, (3) marital status, and (4) presence of 
children. In addition, I examine the possible roles of supply and demand factors in 
creating the regional differences in participation.   
Previous studies have examined the regional variations in women’s 
participation behavior in several different contexts. Acemoglu, Autor, and Lyle (2004) 
show that different mobilization patterns during the World War II era across the United 
States led to regional differences in women’s participation. While mobilization created 
regional variations in women’s participation, the authors show that this phenomenon 
was transitory. Olivetti and Petrongolo (2008) use cross-country data and show that 
substantial differences exist in women’s labor force participation across European 
countries and the United States, and examine the implications of these differences on 
3 
 the gender wage gap.
2 These papers point out the existence and implications of regional 
variations in women’s employment during certain periods and locations, although they 
do not attempt to explain permanent differences in women’s participation behavior 
across regions. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between women’s participation 
and residential choices. Costa and Kahn (2000) show that highly educated "power 
couples" in the United States became more likely to locate in the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs) from 1940 to 1990. They attribute this change to the 
colocation problem, i.e., the difficulty of finding a residence convenient to both spouses' 
workplaces. In contrast, Compton and Pollak (2007) analyze panel data and argue that 
colocation is not a major cause of the concentration of power couples in large MSAs. 
These papers do not pay much attention to the level of women's participation rate. 
Abe (2011b) builds a theoretical model that explains the participation 
differences in regular full-time work and part-time work by women residing in Tokyo 
and suburban Tokyo based on commuting costs and residential choice. Commuting 
costs or housing prices can successfully explain the differences within the Tokyo 
metropolitan area (Tokyo and suburban Tokyo) but probably are less successful in 
                                                        
2  Hunt (2002) makes a similar point in the context of time-series changes in employement and the 
gender wage gap in East Germany in the early 1990s. 
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 explaining the differences among non-metropolitan areas. In particular, commuting 
costs do not provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant differences between 
the northern coastal area and the other non-metropolitan area. 
The contribution of this paper is two-fold. First, this study uses the microdata 
of the Employment Status Survey (ESS; Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication of Japan) to analyze the sources of regional differences in women’s 
participation. The microdata allow me to assess the effects of education, marital status, 
and presence of children, which had been difficult to assess in previous studies that used 
aggregate data. Second, I explore the roles of supply and demand factors that may 
explain the regional variations by examining the occupational variations of workers in 
various demographic and educational groups and by conducting regression analysis.   
I find that the high degree of participation in the northern coastal area comes 
mainly from participation in regular full-time work by married women with children. 
While balancing work and family is considered to be difficult in Japan, women in the 
northern coastal region achieve it in the most challenging way: women who have the 
highest degree of household responsibilities (married women with children) work in 
regular employment (for which working hours tend to be more inflexible than other 
types of employment). For the causes of regional differences, I conclude that a 
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 combination of supply side factors (including work norms) and a demand factor 
(industry structure) would be a reasonable interpretation for high participation in the 
northern coastal region. 
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, basic facts about the 
northern coastal regions are reported. In Section 3, data used in the analysis are 
explained, and definitions are introduced. Section 4 presents the patterns of regional 
variations from raw tabulations of data. Section 5 presents regression results. In Section 
6, I explore the possible interpretations of the findings. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2.  The high-participation region 
  Women’s participation varies greatly in Japan, depending on region. The main 
focus of this paper is the area where women’s participation is much higher than 
elsewhere: the northern coastal area of Honshu Island, prefectures between Yamagata 
and Shimane. Three major metropolitan areas (Tokyo, Chubu, and Kansai) are also a 
major focus of this paper. As explained in the Introduction, the northern coastal region 
is unique in its high rate of women’s participation. 
  To create a sense of the economic characteristics of the high participation 
region, I report basic facts about this region and other regions in this subsection.
3 Table 
                                                        
3  The northern coastal region is not the only place outside of the metropolitan areas that has a high 
degree of women’s participation. Other non-metropolitan areas included in "other" regions (e.g., 
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 1a shows the population share and population growth of six regions in Japan. The 
regional classification used here is the four metropolitan areas (Tokyo, suburban Tokyo, 
Chubu, and Kansai), the northern coastal areas, and the rest of Japan; the “rest of Japan” 
is called the “other region” in this paper. The northern coastal region's population 
contains 6 percent of the total population of Japan, which is about the same as half the 
population of Tokyo. Furthermore, from 1992 to 2007, the population of this region was 
shrinking; the degree of population decline in the northern coastal area is greater (in 
absolute value) than in the “other” area, which is the general non-metropolitan area in 
Japan.  
  The income and wage levels in each of the regions are shown in columns (5) 
and (6) of Table 1a. The income per capita is highest in Tokyo, followed by the three 
metropolitan areas, and is lower in the northern coastal regions and the rest of Japan. 
The mean hourly wage of male full-time workers is shown in column (6). It is highest in 
Tokyo, followed by the metropolitan areas. The male full-time wage in the northern 
coastal region is slightly lower than in the "other" area. In sum, the northern coastal 
region is a low-income, low-wage area. 
  Table 1b shows the industry composition of employment for male and female 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Kochi and Nagano prefectures) have a uniquely high degree of participation. However, these 
prefectures are surrounded by other prefectures with low participation by women. 
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 workers, for selected industries that have large regional variations. The northern coastal 
region and the Chubu region are unique in their high proportions of the manufacturing 
sector. The high share for Chubu is especially notable for men: it is because that this 
region contains a high concentration of the auto industry.
4 Tokyo has especially high 
share of the service sector, for both male and female workers. 
 
3.  Data and definitions 
  The data used in this paper are the microdata of the ESS, which is a large scale 
cross-sectional survey conducted every 5 years; the data I use are from years 1982 and 
2007.
5 I mostly use the cross sectional data from 2007 in this paper. The region variable 
used is the region of residence and not that of employment, because the ESS does not 
collect information on the region of employment. The data have advantages from those 
used in previous research; they are microdata, and they contain the prefectural codes. 
Previous research on regional differences in participation in the labor market used 
aggregate data (e.g., Abe, Kondo, and Mori 2008; Hashimoto and Miyagawa 2008). The 
microdata allow me to assess the effect of education, marital status, and presence of 
children, which was difficult with aggregate data. In order to confine attention to those 
                                                        
4  Chubu is the region where the headquarters of Toyota Motor Co. are located. 
5  The ESS is conducted every 5 years by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of 
Japan. In 2007, the survey was conducted for adults in 450,000 households; the size of the original 
sample was 1 million persons aged 15 and over. The ESS is widely used in empirical studies of the 
Japanese labor market (e.g., Kato 2001; Kawaguchi and Naito 2006; Kawaguchi and Mori 2009; 
Abe and Tamada 2010; Abe 2011a). 
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 who finished schooling and are below the mandatory retirement age, the analysis here 
mostly uses a sample of women aged 25–54 years. 
  In addition to the E-P ratio, two measures are used for gauging participation in 
the labor market: participation in regular employment and participation in part-time 
employment. In Japan, employment as a regular full-time employee and that as a 
non-regular employee (typically, a part-time worker) are quite different in terms of 
wages, hours, fringe benefits, and working conditions (Ogawa and Ermisch, 1996; 
Houseman and Osawa, 2003). Therefore, the regular employment and the part-time 
employment are examined separately. Furthermore, I include executives of private 
corporations in the set of regular employees because many of them are promoted to 
executive positions from regular employee positions.
6 
The regular employment ratio (RER) and part-time employment ratio (PTER) 
are defined as follows: 
 
Number of Regular Employees
,
Population
RER   (1) 
 
Number of Part-time Employees
,
Population
PTER   (2) 
where the “Number of Regular Employees” is the sum of regular employees and 
executives and the “Population” is the population for each cell defined by birth-year, 
                                                        
6  See Abe (2011a) for issues concerning this treatment. 
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 education, and age group.
7 To have a sufficient number of observations per cell, the age 
group is defined in 5-year intervals (i.e., 25–29, 30–34, and so on). Note that the two 
measures above are calculated as shares of the population in each cell, so the 
denominator includes non-workers. These measures are derived for those who finished 
schooling; those who are in school are excluded both from the numerator and from the 
denominator. The level of education I consider in this paper are the following two 




4.  Facts on participation: raw tabulations 
  In this section, I report detailed facts on regional patterns in participation as 
raw tabulations. In particular, I focus on differences between employment status 
(regular or part-time), education, marital status, and presence of children. In Figure 2a, 
the RER is plotted against age. This ratio is higher for university graduates than for the 
less-educated group, but it is obvious that more women engage in regular employment 
in the northern coastal area than in other metropolitan areas, irrespective of age and 
education. Except for university graduate women in Tokyo aged 40 or younger, the RER 
                                                        
7  Part-time workers in the numerator of equation (2) include both part-timers and arbeit workers in 
the ESS. Part-time workers in the ESS correspond to those who are called part-timers in the 
workplace. Therefore, they include non-regular employees whose working hours are relatively long. 
8  Junior high school graduates, who finished the compulsory schooling of 9 years, consist another 
group, but I do not report the results for this group in this paper. 
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 is higher in the northern coastal area than in any other area.   
  Figure 2b plots the PTER in a way similar to Figure 2a. For all regions, 
part-time employment is more prevalent for older ages. The regional patterns in 
part-time employment are quite different from regular employment: the PTERs in the 
northern coastal region are at similar levels as other areas shown here. Taken together, 
the high E-P ratio in the northern coastal area is caused by high participation in regular 
employment and not in part-time employment. 
  It is important to note that regional patterns in women’s employment have 
changed over time. Most notably, the high degree of participation by women in the 
northern coastal region has diminished in recent years. As Figure A1 in the Appendix 
shows, in 1982, the regular employment ratio of women was uniformly higher in the 
northern coastal region than in Tokyo; Figure 2a shows that in 2007, the same ratio was 
at similar levels for women younger than 40. Women who recently received a university 
education increasingly chose to live and work as regular full-time employees in 
metropolitan areas.  
  Figures 3a to 3c plot the E-P ratio, RER, and PTER for married women with 
children. For this group, the high rate of participation in regular employment is even 
more pronounced in the northern coastal region than for all women, especially over age 
11 
 40 (Figure 3b). On the other hand, participation in part-time work is not particularly 
high in the northern coastal region (Figure 3c). For senior high school and junior college 
graduates, relative levels of the PTER differ across age: at ages younger than 40, the 
PTER is high in the northern coastal region, while at older ages, it is lower in the 
northern coastal region than elsewhere. For university graduates, PTER levels are 
similar across regions.   
 
5.  Regression analysis of regional effects 
  The raw tabulations in the previous section show that regional variations exist 
in women’s labor force behavior. How large are the regional effects quantitatively? In 
particular, are there any observable factors that contribute to the regional differences? 
To answer these questions, I turn to the regression analysis of the cell-mean data and 
microdata. The advantages of cell-mean data are that the estimation is simple and the 
results are robust (Donald and Lang 2007). The advantage of microdata regressions is 
that it allows to control for individual-specific covariates at micro unit level. Also, the 
microdata regressions are commonly used in previous studies. 
The regression equation using cell-mean data has the following form: 
  y AgeD RegionD Education   , (3) 
where  y   is the average of one of the labor force measures (E-P ratio, RER, or PTER), 
12 
 AgeD is the set of age dummies, RegionD is the set of region dummies, and Education 
is the set of education dummies.  y   are derived for the cell defined by the combination 
of region, age group, and education. The cell-mean regressions are estimated by 
weighted least squares using the inverse sampling variance of the dependent variable as 
a weight. 
  Regional effects (RegionD in Eq. (3)) are estimated by including dummy 
variables for the five regions ((1) Suburban Tokyo; (2) Tokyo; (3) northern coastal 
region; (4) Chubu (Gifu, Aichi, and Mie); and (5) Kansai Metropolitan Area), and by 
setting the rest of Japan as the base group. Among the five regions other than the base 
group, all but the northern coastal area are the large metropolitan areas.
9 Unless 
otherwise noted, regressions are estimated from the cross sectional data of the 2007 
ESS. 
 
5.1.  Cell-mean regression results for all women 
  As a starting point, I estimate and compare the regional effects for men and 
women. Column (1) of Table 2 reports estimates from women’s E-P ratio, and column 
(2) reports estimates of men’s E-P ratio. The regional effects are clearly greater for 
women than for men: the E-P ratio of women in the northern coastal area is 9 percent 
                                                        
9  Suburban Tokyo and Tokyo belong to the Tokyo metropolitan area, Chubu is the metropolitan area 
around Nagoya, and the Kansai metropolitan area is around Osaka. Hashimoto and Miyagawa 
(2008) report that the E-P ratio is low in the metropolitan areas. 
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 higher than the base group, and that in the Kansai area is 7 percent lower than the base 
group; for men, the absolute values of the regional effects are less than 2 percent. It is 
also noteworthy that women living in the metropolitan areas are less likely to participate 
in the labor market. This is especially so for the suburban Tokyo and Kansai areas. The 
coefficients of education indicate that junior high school graduates are much less likely 
to work, while university graduates are 4 percent more likely to work, compared with 
the base group of senior high school and junior college graduates. 
Next, the regional effects of regular employment of women are examined by 
taking the RER as the dependent variable (column (3)). The effect of the northern 
coastal area is of similar size to the one in the E-P ratio (column (1)), but the effects for 
Tokyo and Chubu are different from those in the E-P ratio. Women living in Tokyo are 
no less likely to work in regular full-time jobs than the base group, while women 
residing in the Chubu area are less likely to work in regular employment than the base 
group. The effects of education show that university graduate women are 15 percent 
more likely to work in regular employment than senior high school and junior college 
graduates. 
Column (4) reports the results for the part-time employment ratio, for which 
the regional patterns are very different from those of regular employment. Part-time 
14 
 employment is clearly lower in Tokyo and is at similar levels elsewhere. The 
coefficients of education show that university graduate women are 14 percent less likely 
to work in part-time employment, which is consistent with previous research. Taken 
together, women’s high participation in the northern coastal area is the result of high 
participation in regular employment, not in part-time employment. 
Next, I examine the impact of marital status and presence of children. Column 
(5) reports the results for married women. The positive effects for the northern coastal 
region are even more pronounced for married women, especially because Tokyo’s effect 
is negative and statistically significant for this group. The specification in column (6) 
includes the interaction terms of a northern coastal area dummy and age over 40 dummy 
and the interaction of a Tokyo dummy and age over 40 dummy to allow for the 
possibility that regional effects differ depending on age. The regular employment ratio 
of married women in the northern coastal area is 4 percent higher than the younger age 
group.  
  Column (7) reports results for regular employment with the sample of single 
women. The magnitude of regional effects is generally small for single women. For 
example, single women in the northern coastal regions are 5 percent more likely to work 
in regular employment than women in the “other” area; this is much smaller than the 13 
15 
 percent for married women. 
Finally, columns (8) and (9) report results for the sample of married women 
with children. The pattern of regional effects is very close to that of married women 
(columns (5) and (6)). Therefore, the high E-P ratio in the northern coastal area is the 
outcome of married women with children working as regular employees in that region.  
 
5.2.  Cell-mean regression results for educational subgroups 
  Are strong regional effects shown in the previous section present for all 
education groups? Raw tabulations in Section 4 suggest that regional effects might be 
different depending on education. To examine this issue, I present estimates in this 
section similar to the ones in Table 2 for the two education groups: (1) senior high 
school and junior college graduates and (2) university graduates or over.   
  The analysis in the previous section confirms that regional differences are most 
pronounced for married women with children. For this group, it is possible to control 
for covariates that are related to husband and household: husband's income, husband's 
education, and whether the household is three-generation household or not. Therefore, I 
augment Eq.  (3) as  follows: 
  y AgeD RegionD Z    . (4) 
Here,  Z   is the regional average of individual characteristics (co-residence with one of 
16 
 the parents, husband's education, and husband's earnings).
10 
11 Previous studies find that 
these factors are related to women’s participation in the labor market in Japan (e.g., 
Sasaki 2002; Nawata and Ii 2004). 
 
5.2.1.  Senior high school and junior college graduates 
  Table 3a presents estimates from regressions for senior high school and junior 
college graduates. The northern coastal region still has a high regular employment ratio 
for this group. The effects for other metropolitan areas are different, however. The effect 
of Tokyo is close to zero for all women but negative and statistically significant for 
married women, suggesting that regular employment is common for unmarried women 
who reside in Tokyo.   
  Columns (4) and (5) report results for married women with children. The 
regional effects are close to those of married women (column (2)). Column (5) includes 
the interaction terms of a dummy for those over age 40 and Tokyo and a dummy for 
those over age 40 and the northern coastal area. While the effect of (Tokyo)×(age over 
40) is small and statistically insignificant, the effect of (Northern coastal area) ×(age 
over 40) is 0.05 and statistically significant. Therefore, the high RER in the northern 
                                                        
10  The "Education" variables are excluded from Eq.(3)  because regressions in this section are done 
for education subgroups. 
11  Any factor that is capable of explaining the regional differences in female participation should 
have regional differences as regional average (or regional aggregate). 
17 
 coastal region is more pronounced for ages over 40. 
  Controlling for the region-level average of covariates (column (6)) decreases 
the coefficients of northern coastal region somewhat (from 0.11 to 0.07 for the northern 
coastal dummy, and from 0.05 to 0.02 for the (Northern coastal area) ×(age over 40) 
dummy), but it is still the case that women residing in the northern coastal area are more 
likely to work in regular full-time employment. 
 
5.2.2. University  graduates 
  Table 3b reports results from the sample of university graduate women. Similar 
to Tables 2 and 3a, the northern coastal area has a high regular employment ratio for 
university graduates. The effect for Tokyo is different: for the highly educated group, 
single women living in Tokyo are more likely to work in regular employment than those 
who reside in the base group (column (3)). However, this positive effect turns negative 
for married women. Furthermore, the effect of the interaction term of (age over 40)×
(Tokyo) shows that the negative coefficient of Tokyo is more pronounced for those aged 
over 40. This is consistent with Figure 2a, in which the regular employment ratio is at 
similar levels in Tokyo and the northern coastal area for ages below 40, but there is a 
divergence over age 40.   
  The regional effects for married women with children are greater in magnitude 
18 
 for university graduates than for senior high school and junior college graduates. In 
particular, the negative effects for metropolitan areas are greater in absolute value, while 
the positive effects for the northern coastal areas are at a similar magnitude for the 
less-educated group (column (4) of Tables 3a and 3b). The region coefficients for 
married women (column (2)) and married women with children (column (4)) differ 
slightly for suburban Tokyo and Tokyo, while the coefficients for other regions are 
close.  
  Controlling for the region-level average of covariates (column (6)) decreases 
the coefficient of the northern coastal dummy significantly, from 0.08 to 0.03. The 
coefficient of (Northern coastal area) ×(age over 40) dummy becomes smaller too, 
from 0.1 to 0.075, but the magnitude of this coefficient still remains large. 
 
 
5.3.  Microdata regression results 
 
Previous studies used microdata to estimate reduced-form labor supply equations. 
To compare the estimates to previous studies, in this subsection I report microdata 
regression results. Specifically, I estimate microdata regressions of the following form: 
  ii y AgeD RegionD Z   
where 
, (5) 
i Z  includes a dummy for co-residence (three-generation household), husband’s 
19 
 earnings, and husband’s education. Standard errors are corrected to allow for arbitrary 
correlations of error terms across individuals within each prefecture. Eq. (5) is estimated 
for the sample of education subgroups and results are shown in column (7) of Table 3a 
and 3b.
12 The coefficients of individual covariates have signs that are broadly consistent 
with previous studies: co-residence increases participation and higher husband’s income 
decreases participation. 
  In the cell-mean regressions that include  Z  (the regional mean of  Z ), the 
impact of  Z  is estimated from "between-region" variations in  Z . On the other hand, 
in microdata regressions that include region dummies and  i Z , the impact of Z  is 
estimated from "within-region" variations in  i Z .  For instance, male income have 
across-region variations (high-income area and other area), but there are also 
within-region variations across households. Furthermore, by construction, the amount of 
variations in Z   (cell-mean regressions with 36 observations) and that in  i Z  
(microdata regressions with 80000 observations for senior high school and junior 
college sample) are different: for the case of husband's income reported in Table 3a, the 
standard deviation of  Z   is 0.17, while that of  i Z  is  1.09.  Therefore, the magnitude of 
coefficients is generally greater in the cell-mean regressions. Comparison of estimates 
                                                        
12  The linear probability results are reported, but the probit estimates yield the marginal effects 
values that are similar to the linear probability estimates. 
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 in columns (6) and (7) indicate that the coefficients of "within" and "between" 
variations are sometimes very different. 
  The coefficients of regional effects reported in columns (5) and (7) of Tables 3a 
and 3b are close. In particular, women in the northern coastal region are more likely to 
participate in regular full-time employment than women residing in the base group 
region, for both education groups. Therefore, controlling for individual  i Z  do not 
change the magnitude of regional effects much.   
 
 
6.  What are the explanations? 
 
  The results so far have established that the high E-P ratio in the northern 
coastal area is the result of married women with children being more likely to work as 
regular employees in that region. This pattern is present both for the highly educated 
and less-educated groups. The high degree of regular employment of women residing in 
the northern coastal region is found in various specifications of various demographic 
and educational groups and is quite robust. 
  This observation is somewhat surprising for the following reasons. Generally, it 
is believed that balancing work and family is not easy for Japanese women. Therefore, 
even though women’s participation has risen over time, the increase has been attributed 
21 
 to (1) the increase in part-time employment among women and (2) the rise in regular 
employment of young women (younger than age 40). Regular employment for married 
women has not advanced much over time (Abe 2011a). Nonetheless, in the region with 
a relatively small population, women’s regular employment is high, particularly so for 
married women with children. What are the causes for these consistent regional 
differences? In the rest of this section, I explore the supply and demand factors that 
might explain the regional effects. 
 
6.1.  Demand side factors 
  One might expect that industry structure of the region has something to do with 
regional differences in participation. Given the evidence presented in Sections 4 and 5, 
however, this explanation requires caution. The consistent pattern seen in this paper is 
that the high degree of participation in the northern coastal areas is found for married 
women with children. If the region has an industry structure that accompanies a strong 
demand for women’s labor, it has to be a strong demand for married women’s labor to 
explain the pattern across marital statuses. It is not clear what kind of industries 
particularly favor married women’s labor to the extent to create the large differences in 
participation. Furthermore, since participation in part-time employment is similar across 
regions, the types of regional variations in labor demand have to be such that a stronger 
22 
 demand for regular employment instead of part-time employment. 
  With that caveat in mind, Table 4a shows the occupational distribution of 
women in each region in 2007. The major occupational classifications in the ESS are as 
follows: professional, managerial, clerical, sales, service, security, agricultural, 
transportation, and manual. To circumvent problems associated with the level of 
participation in regular employment, the category "Not working as regular employees" 
is added as one of the occupation categories in tabulating Table 4a. In this table, the 
single women's sample is restricted to those younger than 40. I exclude occupational 
categories for which the proportion of regular workers in that occupation is less than 2 
percent for all of the six regions. For purpose of comparison, Tables 4b and 4c show the 
similar occupational distributions for married women working as part-time employees 
and men working as regular employees, respectively. 
  Several notable patterns stand out. First, the occupational distributions differ 
significantly across educational lines. For regular employment of female university 
graduates, the proportions of manual and service occupations are low; instead, senior 
high school and junior college graduates work in these occupations. Highly educated 
women who work in regular employment tend to work in professional and clerical 
occupations.  
23 
 Second, regional differences in occupational distribution are small for single 
women working as regular employees, for men working as regular employees, and for 
women working as part-time employees; on the other hand, they differ significantly for 
married women across education groups. For married women with a high school or 
junior college education, the northern coastal area has a high fraction of manual 
workers; the proportion of this occupation is low for other regions. For university 
graduate married women, professional occupations have a higher proportion in the 
northern coastal area than elsewhere. Therefore, it is not the case that certain industries 
favor female labor or that these industries attract women into regular employment for 
the two education groups; if that were the case, women of different education groups 
would be working in similar occupations.   
The high participation of the less-educated group in manual occupations in the 
northern coastal region could be related to a high proportion of manufacturing in this 
region. The presence of the manufacturing sector does not automatically mean that 
women are more likely to work, however: in the Chubu region, where the share of the 
manufacturing sector is high, single women work more in manual jobs, although 
married women do not. 
 
24 
 6.2.  Supply side factors 
  One might think that the regional differences in childcare resources explain the 
participation differences of women. Indeed, childcare resources are more available in 
the northern coastal regions than in the metropolitan areas.
13 For instance, the number 
of children waiting for a vacancy in a nursery school is high in the metropolitan areas, 
while the number is zero for most of the northern coastal region. However, this may not 
be the main reason for the high participation of women over age 40 because children of 
women of these ages are much less likely to enroll in nursery schools; note that the high 
participation in regular full-time work in the northern coastal region is more pronounced 
for this age group (Tables 3a and 3b).
14  
  As reported in Tables 3a and 3b, co-residence increases regular full-time work 
by married women with children, and controlling for co-residence and husband's 
education and earnings decreases the absolute value of regional effects; however, the 
regional effects remain for senior high school graduates and university graduates aged 
over 40. Therefore, co-residence and other observable supply-side characteristics 
partially explain the regional differences.   
  The fact that observable supply-side characteristics do not fully explain 
                                                        
13  Hashimoto and Miyagawa (2008) and Unayama (2009a, 2009b) point this out as one of the 
leading factors in explaining regional differences in fertility. 
14  Regarding the positive correlation of childcare resources and participation, the reverse causality is 
also possible: more childcare services are provided because women have higher incentives for work 
in the northern coastal region. 
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 regional differences, especially for senior high school and junior college group, is 
consistent with the pattern of the occupational distribution reported in Tables 4a–4c. If 
supply-side factors explain most of regional differences, occupational distributions are 
unlikely to differ much from those in areas with similar industry distribution (e.g., 
northern coastal region and Chubu).   
 
7.  Conclusions 
  This study uses cross-sectional data to investigate the regional differences in 
women's participation in the labor market. Women's participation is high in the northern 
coastal region of Japan. A higher proportion of married women with children participate 
as regular full-time employees in the northern coastal region than in other regions; the 
regional differences are small for married women’s participation in part-time work and 
for single women’s participation in regular full-time work. Since the degree of regional 
variations differs depending on marital status and presence of children, supply-side 
factors are likely to play an important role for the regional differences in participation. 
In fact, the proportion of three-generation household in the region and the mean male 
earnings explain a part of regional differences. Nevertheless, controlling for supply-side 
factors do not eliminate regional differences.   
The occupational distributions across regions reveal that married women with 
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 less education in the northern coastal region are more likely to work in manual 
occupations than women residing elsewhere. This fact, together with the fact that the 
share of manufacturing employment is high in the northern coastal region, suggests that 
industry composition plays some role in women’s high participation in that region. 
Therefore, a combination of (1) supply-side factors that motivates women to work, 
including work norms and (2) a high degree of manufacturing in the northern coastal 
region would probably be a reasonable explanation for the high participation in the 
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Population share and population growth of each region



















Suburban Tokyo 0.183 0.005 0.186 0.319 3109 2.076
Tokyo 0.111 0.050 0.192 0.420 4540 2.550
Northern Coast 0.058 -0.092 -0.002 0.203 2736 1.703
Chubu 0.090 0.001 0.179 0.266 3377 2.017
Kansai 0.133 -0.074 0.118 0.293 2996 2.088




Note: Population share in 2007 is based on those aged 25-54.
Population growth is calculated between year 1992 and 2007.
Source: Employment Status Survey (published version), Prefecture Income Statistics, Basic Survey of Wage Structure
29Table 1b
Industry share of workers (workers' age range=25-54)
Male
Region Agriculture Manufacturing Service
Suburban Tokyo 0.009 0.244 0.235
Tokyo 0.003 0.182 0.296
Northern Coast 0.022 0.250 0.199
Chubu 0.011 0.345 0.181
Kansai 0.005 0.256 0.208
Other 0.031 0.224 0.213
Female
Region Agriculture Manufacturing Service
Suburban Tokyo 0.015 0.156 0.367
Tokyo 0.003 0.123 0.416
Northern Coast 0.024 0.254 0.346
Chubu 0.019 0.243 0.325
Kansai 0.005 0.186 0.358
Other 0.041 0.183 0.365
Notes: The shares are calculated from the number of workers, without adjusting for working hours.
Source: Employment Status Survey (published version)
30Table 2
Regional differences in women's and men's participation in the labor market
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
EPR EPR RER PTER RER RER RER RER RER













Suburban Tokyo -0.055** 0.005** -0.055** 0.002 -0.063** -0.063** -0.019* -0.070** -0.070**
(0.011) (0.002) (0.007) (0.012) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004)
Tokyo -0.020 0.003 -0.002 -0.042** -0.039** -0.019* 0.023 -0.050** -0.044**
(0.018) (0.003) (0.013) (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.016) (0.006) (0.005)
Northern Coast 0.086** 0.012** 0.099** -0.017 0.126** 0.103** 0.047** 0.129** 0.099**
(0.010) (0.002) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Chubu -0.001 0.020** -0.027** 0.021 -0.036** -0.036** 0.024* -0.039** -0.039**
(0.011) (0.002) (0.006) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Kansai -0.067** -0.007** -0.062** -0.000 -0.076** -0.076** -0.032** -0.078** -0.078**
(0.008) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)
Tokyo×(Age>40) -0.036** -0.011
(0.013) (0.010)
(Northern Coast)×(Age>40) 0.040** 0.053**
(0.013) (0.013)
Junior High Grads -0.116** -0.105** -0.146** 0.023 -0.093** -0.093** -0.306** -0.084** -0.084**
(0.012) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
University Grads 0.035** 0.024** 0.148** -0.136** 0.125** 0.125** 0.148** 0.111** 0.111**
(0.010) (0.001) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Observations 108 108 107 108 106 106 107 104 104
R-squared 0.858 0.917 0.930 0.926 0.950 0.958 0.954 0.946 0.956
Notes: Age dummies and a constant are included in all regressions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level; ** at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
Source: Author's calculation from the ESS, 2007 (microdata).
31Table 3a: Regression results for senior high school and junior college graduates






















Suburban Tokyo -0.054** -0.063** -0.019* -0.067** -0.067** -0.042 -0.053**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.026) (0.008)
Tokyo -0.005 -0.034** 0.007 -0.042** -0.042** 0.006 -0.027**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.023) (0.008)
Northern Coast 0.102** 0.130** 0.045** 0.133** 0.107** 0.073** 0.095**
(0.010) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.014)
Chubu -0.029** -0.031** 0.013 -0.034** -0.035** -0.055 -0.029**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.031) (0.008)
Kansai -0.063** -0.071** -0.047** -0.073** -0.073** -0.042** -0.063**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.013)
Tokyo×(Age>40) 0.001 0.034* 0.009*
(0.009) (0.012) (0.004)
(Northern Coast)×(Age>40) 0.045** 0.020 0.040**
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011)
three-generation household 0.197 0.087**
(0.114) (0.010)
husband educ=junior high 0.434 -0.007
(0.221) (0.007)
husband educ=university -0.353* -0.019**
(0.147) (0.004)
log(husband's earnings) 0.155 -0.011**
(0.134) (0.002)
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 87697
R-squared 0.966 0.973 0.916 0.972 0.983 0.991 0.032
Notes: Age dummies and a constant are included in all regressions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The base group for husband's education is senior high school or junior college graduates.
For column (6), the explanatory variables of the covariates are the mean value of each region; for column (7), they
are values for individuals.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level; ** at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
Source: Author's calculation from the ESS, 2007 (microdata).
32Table 3b: Regression results for university graduates






















Suburban Tokyo -0.059** -0.074** 0.001 -0.104** -0.104** -0.065 -0.084**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.011) (0.022) (0.022) (0.044) (0.018)
Tokyo 0.013 -0.068* 0.071** -0.100** -0.065** -0.046 -0.049**
(0.040) (0.032) (0.025) (0.018) (0.019) (0.055) (0.015)
Northern Coast 0.092** 0.126** 0.047** 0.128** 0.075** 0.029 0.061**
(0.026) (0.029) (0.010) (0.032) (0.018) (0.025) (0.020)
Chubu -0.038 -0.067** 0.043** -0.079** -0.079** -0.072 -0.069**
(0.023) (0.019) (0.014) (0.024) (0.026) (0.039) (0.022)
Kansai -0.067** -0.101** -0.012 -0.115** -0.115** -0.070* -0.099**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.030) (0.020)
Tokyo×(Age>40) -0.058* 0.018 -0.033*
(0.023) (0.025) (0.014)
(Northern Coast)×(Age>40) 0.106** 0.075* 0.111**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.024)
three-generation household 0.610* 0.131**
(0.282) (0.021)
husband educ=university 0.556* 0.000
(0.260) (0.009)
log(husband's earnings) -0.058 -0.035**
(0.146) (0.005)
Observations 36 36 36 36 36 36 12223
0.844 0.793 0.710 0.863 0.902 0.932 0.036
Notes: Age dummies and a constant are included in all regressions.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The base group for husband's education is "not university."
For column (6), the explanatory variables of the covariates are the mean value of each region; for column (7), they
are values for individuals.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level; ** at the 1% level (two-tailed tests).
Source: Author's calculation from the ESS, 2007 (microdata).
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Senior High &  Single Not Regular emp 0.524 0.502 0.447 0.491 0.547 0.496
Junior College Grads Professional 0.110 0.111 0.130 0.127 0.120 0.138
Clerical 0.212 0.227 0.195 0.206 0.187 0.193
Sales 0.053 0.067 0.057 0.044 0.037 0.047
Service 0.049 0.047 0.086 0.059 0.052 0.068
Manual 0.029 0.027 0.071 0.061 0.035 0.043
Senior High &  Married Not Regular emp 0.828 0.799 0.634 0.796 0.836 0.763
Junior College Grads Professional 0.041 0.050 0.084 0.047 0.042 0.065
Clerical 0.079 0.094 0.134 0.083 0.067 0.086
Sales 0.016 0.015 0.027 0.017 0.015 0.019
Service 0.016 0.017 0.039 0.022 0.017 0.028
Manual 0.011 0.012 0.073 0.028 0.016 0.028
University Grads Single Not Regular emp 0.357 0.276 0.310 0.315 0.373 0.362
Professional 0.205 0.222 0.250 0.225 0.201 0.244
Clerical 0.300 0.327 0.327 0.329 0.285 0.273
Sales 0.078 0.097 0.046 0.068 0.080 0.055
Service 0.020 0.018 0.026 0.018 0.013 0.021
Manual 0.017 0.015 0.025 0.019 0.017 0.021
University Grads Married Not Regular emp 0.702 0.687 0.509 0.701 0.732 0.633
Professional 0.139 0.114 0.289 0.138 0.122 0.216
Clerical 0.118 0.145 0.137 0.115 0.092 0.103
Sales 0.013 0.024 0.016 0.016 0.024 0.016
Notes: Entries for the "Not Regular emp" are the proportions of people who are not regular employees among population, including non-workers.
Single women's sample is restricted to those aged below 40.
Source: Author's calculation from the ESS, 2007 (microdata).
34Table 4b
Occupational distribution of female part-time workers, by region: Married women







Senior High &  Married Not Part 0.683 0.744 0.716 0.659 0.708 0.693
Junior College Grads Professional 0.029 0.027 0.022 0.036 0.033 0.028
Clerical 0.093 0.093 0.086 0.096 0.084 0.083
Sales 0.041 0.031 0.035 0.041 0.035 0.039
Service 0.068 0.057 0.051 0.062 0.060 0.061
Manual 0.073 0.038 0.081 0.094 0.067 0.085
University Grads Married Not Part 0.844 0.866 0.872 0.840 0.822 0.863
Professional 0.036 0.035 0.031 0.040 0.035 0.033
Clerical 0.062 0.047 0.050 0.060 0.073 0.053
Sales 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.014 0.023 0.013
Service 0.020 0.022 0.018 0.024 0.028 0.018
Notes: Entries for the "Not Part" are the proportions of people who are not part-time employees among population, including non-workers.
Single women's sample is restricted to those aged below 40.
Source: Author's calculation from the ESS, 2007 (microdata).
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Senior High &  Not RegFT 0.213 0.276 0.184 0.191 0.261 0.227
Junior College Grads Professional 0.090 0.100 0.061 0.061 0.069 0.062
Managerial 0.017 0.028 0.020 0.022 0.017 0.020
Clerical 0.120 0.111 0.094 0.089 0.095 0.100
Sales 0.110 0.112 0.109 0.089 0.113 0.098
Service 0.040 0.060 0.036 0.029 0.044 0.038
Security 0.032 0.012 0.027 0.025 0.021 0.033
Transp 0.053 0.048 0.056 0.055 0.048 0.057
Manual 0.300 0.228 0.392 0.415 0.309 0.343
University Grads Not RegFT 0.105 0.140 0.111 0.110 0.149 0.130
Professional 0.258 0.235 0.265 0.228 0.228 0.246
Managerial 0.032 0.043 0.045 0.034 0.037 0.040
Clerical 0.242 0.226 0.210 0.210 0.188 0.213
Sales 0.202 0.202 0.166 0.200 0.216 0.174
Service 0.011 0.018 0.016 0.018 0.020 0.020
Security 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.020 0.019 0.026
Manual 0.093 0.071 0.143 0.154 0.108 0.125
Notes: Entries for the "Not Regular emp" are the proportions of people who are not regular employees among population, including non-workers.
Source: Author's calculation from the ESS, 2007 (microdata).
36Figure 1a
Female participation in 2007
Figure 1b
Male participation in 2007
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Female regular employment ratio
Fig  2b
Female part-time employment ratio









20 30 40 50 20 30 40 50
Senior High & Junior College University



































20 30 40 50 20 30 40 50
Senior High & Junior College University





























Employment-Population ratio of married women with children
Fig  3b
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Part-time employment ratio of married women with children
Source: Author's calculation from the ESS (micro data).
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Female participation in 1982
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